Adaptive Play in a Pollution Bargaining Game by van der Goes, V.A.N.M.
VU Research Portal
Adaptive Play in a Pollution Bargaining Game
van der Goes, V.A.N.M.
published in
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Artificial Evolution (EA-2011)
2011
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
van der Goes, V. A. N. M. (2011). Adaptive Play in a Pollution Bargaining Game. In Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference on Artificial Evolution (EA-2011) Springer Verlag.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 14. Sep. 2021
Adaptive Play in a Pollution Bargaining Game
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Abstract. We apply adaptive play to a simplified pollution game with
two players. We find that agents with longer memory paradoxically per-
form worse in the long run. We interpret this result as an indication that
adaptive play may be too restrictive as a model of agent behaviour in
this context, although it can serve as a starting point for further research
on bounded rationality in pollution games.
Keywords: evolutionary economics, game theory, adaptive play
1 Introduction
Global environmental problems, such as pollution, provide real-world examples
of a social dilemma. Countries involved in an environmental issue could often
benefit from mutual cooperation. However, if they choose to do so, any country
in the cooperation might benefit from free riding. That is, each country could
possibly improve net welfare by defecting and profiting from the efforts at re-
ducing pollution, without reducing its own pollution.
So it is in the mutual interest of countries involved in such an environmental
problem to find a way to facilitate cooperation. To this end, countries have
signed treaties known as International Environmental Agreements (IEA’s).
In particular, the case of greenhouse gas emissions is receiving a lot of attention
today. Greenhouse gas emission is a form of transboundary pollution, i.e. the
impacts of emissions are global and do not depend on the location where they
originate. As reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is very costly, it provides a
good example of a social dilemma. Agreeing on an appropriate IEA has proven
difficult in practice.
In the literature this has sparked a discussion about the question why nego-
tiations on reduction of emissions are so difficult and what kind of policy in-
struments could help on reaching an agreement. For a recent overview of the
literature in this area we refer the reader to [2] and [3].
A common way of modelling emission reductions is as a repeated game. The dy-
namics of a realistic model are highly complex, as there are several complicating
factors at play. The game changes over time, as greenhouse gas concentrations
build up and new technologies become available.
Also, there is a high degree of uncertainty, especially considering the long time
scale at which the climate responds [6]. First of all systematic uncertainty : dam-
age as a function of emissions is hard to predict. Secondly strategic uncertainty :
agents can not predict the behaviour of other agents very well.
In this paper we explore the possibility of modelling bargaining for reduction of
emissions of a transboundary pollutant, while assuming only bounded rational-
ity and imperfect information. We focus on the question whether agents will be
able to coordinate on an efficient outcome under these conditions. In particular,
we look at the effect of asymmetry in information.
The agents in our model will bargain on pollution abatement levels, using the
adaptive play mechanism [9] to optimize their results. In adaptive play, agents are
myopic: payoff in future rounds is not taken into account. Instead, the agents re-
member the earlier choices of other agents, assume they will make similar choices
at present and search for a best response. The agents will also make occasional
errors. This is to account for the fact that agents in the real world will occa-
sionally act irrational, or there might be an unexpected external factor playing
a role.
The bargaining game in our model is defined in two steps. The first step in the
definition of our model is a toy model of transboundary pollution, the pollution
game. The model is attractive for study and has been widely used for analysis
with perfect information and rational agents, e.g. [1] [8]. We make a further sim-
plification to the model, as we limit it to two agents.
Within the context of this pollution game, we assume that agents can make
binding agreements on abatement for one round. At the beginning of each round,
the agents will play a bargaining game over their abatement levels during that
round. In the bargaining game both agents simultaneously make a proposal for
the abatement levels. If the two proposals are mutually compatible, an agree-
ment is made for that round. If the proposals are not compatible with each other,
the agents have failed to make an agreement in that round and they will both
choose their abatement levels according to the Nash equilibrium of the pollution
game, instead.
We investigate the behavior of this model by running simulations. We find that
agents are able to reach Pareto efficient outcomes, even though this is not true
for all parameter settings. However, when one agent has a longer memory of past
actions than the other, our behaviour model predicts that he will be worse off
in the long run. This is a rather paradoxal finding. There is very little difference
between our model and the bargaining model in [10], except that the underlying
pollution game has a different payoff structure. Yet, in that study agents with
longer memory were consistently better off.
This leads to two conclusions. First, it shows that the result in [10] does not
generalize very well to other classes of bargaining games. Secondly, it is an indi-
cation that adaptive play may compromise the rationality of agents too strongly
to be suitable as a model for this particular bargaining game.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the bar-
gaining game. The pollution game is defined and analyzed in section 2.1 and in
section 2.2 it is extended with a bargaining mechanism. Section 2.3 defines the
behaviour of the agents. Section 3 contains the experiments. The simulations
are motivated and detailed in section 3.1. The experimental results are given in
section 3.2 and section 4 concludes and suggests paths for further research.
2 Model
2.1 The Pollution Game
We model negotiations between two agents on emissions of a pollutant. The
pollutant is transboundary and damage functions depend only on total emissions.
Agents have the options to abate, lowering their emission for one period at a cost.
The emphasis of the study is on learning dynamics. For this purpose we employ
a strongly simplified pollution model, known as the standard model [1] [8]. We
assume that costs of abatement are independent between agents and do not
change over time. Further, it is assumed that the pollutant does not accumulate
in the environment, even though greenhouse gases are in reality a stock pollutant.
Also, all agents have the same damage function.
Agents are labelled i = 1, 2. They have an fixed unabated emission level a/2,
where a is the aggragate emission level. They can spend on abatement, resulting
in benefits for every agent. Hence, the benefits to agent i depend on the total
abatement level Q. We assume linear marginal abatement benefits Bi(Q). This
leads to a quadratical benefit function, as specified in equation 1.
Bi(Q) = b(aQ−Q2/2)/2 (1)
The marginal benefit of the first unit of abatement is ba/2, with b a positive
parameter. When total abatement equals total emission, the marginal benefit of
further abatement is zero.
The costs of abatement Ci(qi) for agent i depends only on the abatement qi of
that agent, where Q = q1 + q2. The marginal costs of abatement are assumed to




where c is a positive parameter. The resulting net payoff vector or utility
vector is shown in equation 3.
ui(q1, q2) = Bi(q1 + q2)− Ci(qi) (3)
The Nash Equilibrium In the Nash equilibrium, both agents optimize their
own payoff, without considering the possibility of mutual benefits from cooper-
ation. This is known as non-cooperative behaviour.
In the pollution game of section 2.1, the Nash equilibrium can be calculated by
taking the partial derivatives of the utility functions of both agents with respect
to their own abatement level. Solving for the first order conditions yields a single
symmetric Nash equilibrium, given in equation 4.




Here the Nash equilibrium is denoted as qD, because it will serve as the
disagreement point in the bargaining game in section 2.2. The Nash equilibrium
yields equal utility uD = u1(qD, qD) to both players.
The Pareto Frontier The Nash equilibrium of this game is not Pareto op-
timal. Both agents could increase their payoff by cooperation. Therefore, this
game is an example of a social dilemma, similar to the prisoner’s dilemma.
If the agents cooperate, they will ideally choose Pareto optimal abatement lev-
els. Additionally, both agents should receive greater payoff than in the Nash
equilibrium. The symmetric solution on the Pareto frontier, the Nash bargaining
solution (q∗, q∗) (see equation 5), satisfies both conditions. In [7], it is shown
that under certain assumptions, the Nash bargaining solution will be the result





However, it should be noted that in our simulations the agents will not have
perfect information, nor will they necessarily have identical bargaining power.
The complete Pareto frontier can be characterized by maximizing the weighted
average of u1 and u2 in equation 6, with weight α.
αu1(q1, q2) + (1− α)u2(q1, q2) (6)





1 + 2α(1− α)c/b
q∗2(α) =
αa
1 + 2α(1− α)c/b
(7)
In the special case that α = 1/2, the solution in equation 7 reduces to the
Nash bargaining solution (q∗, q∗). The extreme points of the Pareto front are the
cases α = 0 and α = 1. In these cases, one agent does not abate and the other
agent chooses an abatement level of a.
2.2 The Bargaining Game
The pollution game described in section 2.1 is assumed to be repeated for an
unlimited number of rounds. Under such conditions, cooperation is possible,
according to the folk theorem [5]. However, the incentive for agents to cooperate,
rather than to play the Nash equilibrium, is that cooperation in this round may
be rewarded by the other agent in later rounds.
In this work we will look at agents with no forward looking abilities. With such
limited rationality, agents will not be able to cooperate unless some bargaining
mechanism is added to the game.
Therefore, we add a simple bargaining system. Let agent −i denote the opposite
agent from agent i. Instead of choosing abatement levels directly, both agents




i,2) for the abatement levels in round
t. Here q̂ti,i is the level of abatement that agent i is offering himself. However, in
exchange, agent i demands an abatement level of at least q̂i,−i from agent −i.
Only if the offers and demands of both agents are compatible, the negotiations
result in cooperation for round t. Otherwise, the agents fail to reach an agreement
in round t and they will play the Nash equilibrium of the pollution game instead.
Denote the boolean value of this requirement as ∆ ∈ [true, false]:
∆(pti, p
t
−i) = ∀i : q̂ti,i ≥ q̂t−i,i (8)
If condition 8 is met, both agents are willing to abate at least as much as
the other agent demands. But it is not yet clear what the final agreement will
be. Will qti be set to the level q̂
t
i,i that i offered himself, or to the level q̂
t
−i,i
that the other agent demanded? In general, we could imagine the final result of
negotiations to be any value in between the two. We assume that the agents will
share the difference in a manner agreed upon prior to negotiations. The final
abatement level of agent i will be a weighted average of the abatement level that
agent i offered and the abatement level that was required, as in equation 9. The







λq̂ti,i + (1− λ)q̂t−i,i if ∆(pti, pt−i)
qD otherwise
(9)
Note that if requirement 8 fails, the agents abort negotiations and instead
revert to the disagreement point, which is the Nash equilibrium of the pollution
game.




−i), then follows by inserting










Nash Equilibria of the Bargaining Game The negotiation process thus de-
fined constitutes a new game, where the actions agents have to choose from are
the proposals they make. In order to distinguish this game from the pollution
game itself, we will refer to it as the bargaining game. Where the pollution game
has only a single Nash equilibrium, the bargaining game has many.
Consider the solution where, for i = 1, 2, q̂ti,i = 0 and q̂
t
i,−i = a. This is a degen-
erate Nash equilibrium. Since requirement 8 is not met, the result is that both
players play the Nash equilibrium qti = qD in the pollution game. Neither agent
can improve his own utility by deviating unilaterally.
The game also has many non-degenerate equilibria, where both players end up
with higher utility than in the Nash equilibrium of the pollution game. For ex-
ample, consider q̂ti,i = q̂
t
i,−i = q
∗. This leads to the Nash Bargaining Solution of
the pollution game. Both agents have improved their utility over uD and neither
agent could improve his utility further by a unilateral deviation from his nego-
tiation strategy.
Any non-degenerate equilibrium of the bargaining game must be Pareto dom-
inant over the Nash equilibrium of the pollution game. If it does not, then at
least one agent is worse off than uD and therefore has an incentive to let the
negotiations fail instead, by lowering his abatement offer.
If λ < 1, any non-degenerate Nash equilibrium, with at least one player ending









negotiations fail. But if q̂ti,i > q̂
t
−i,i, then agent −i has an incentive to increase
q̂t−i,i, since by equation 9 this would increase the abatement of i, but leave his
own abatement unchanged. As an increase in the abatement of i increases the
benefits for −i but not his costs, the utility of agent −i would increase.
Provided that 0 < λ < 1, any solution of the bargaining game that satisfies both
of these conditions is a Nash equilibrium of the bargaining game. Neither player
has an incentive to change his own proposed abatement q̂ti,i, because it would
either let the negotiations fail or it would cause him to increase his abatement
level further above qD, lowering his utility. Similarly, neither player has an in-
centive to change the abatement level he demands from the opponent, q̂ti,−i.
Now that we identified the non-degenerate Nash equilibria (at least for 0 < λ <
1), we can calculate the corresponding range of values for qti .
The extreme points of the region that Pareto dominates qD are on the Pareto
frontier of the pollution game, as defined by q∗i (α) in equation 7. We have the
constraint that qti ≤ qD. Solving for α in equation 7, we find that the region
of non-degenerate Nash equilibria is bounded by the values qmin and qmax in
equation 11.
We will assume that agents only consider values for their proposals in the range
[qmin, qmax]. It could be argued that the agents have insufficient information to
know qmin and qmax ahead of time. However, if our agent model is applied to
the Pollution Game itself, rather than to the Bargaining Game, it will converge
to the unique Nash equilibrium (qD, qD), so it is not altogether unreasonable to
postulate that agents are aware of qmin = qD, at least.
αmin =
√
b2 + 2bc− b
2c
αmax = 1− αmin
qmin = qD





In this section we describe how agents decide what proposals to make in the
negotiations of section 2.2. Agents are assumed to have bounded rationality.
They do not have any forward looking abilities and do not know each others
payoff functions. Instead, they form a model of the behaviour of the other agents,
in order to find the best response to their actions.
We apply the adaptive play mechanism [9]. In adaptive play, agents assume
that the other agents draw their proposals from a fixed probability distribution.
In other words, they assume that the other agent plays a mixed strategy that
doesn’t change over time.
Agents have a limited memory mi. Only actions chosen by the other agent in
the latest mi rounds are remembered. The agents then assume that the other
agent will play any of the actions that he played during the last mi rounds, each
with equal probability.
Based on this internal model of the opponent, the agents search for an optimal
response. They will maximize the expected final utility of their proposal pti. Let
(x, y) be a candidate proposal for pti. It is evaluated by the expected value of the
utility that it could yield:







−i), q−i((x, y), p
t′
−i)) (12)
Where qi is calculated as in equation 9 and ui as in equation 3. The function
f ti (x, y) serves as a fitness function.
The agent will then make the proposal that maximizes this fitness function:
pti = argmax
(x,y)∈[qmin,qmax]2
f ti (x, y) (13)
In case there are multiple values of (x, y) that maximize f(x, y), one value is
drawn from the set with a uniform random distribution.
However, in adaptive play, agents are allowed to make occasional errors. These
are introduced to take into account that agents in the real world occasionally
behave unpredictably, because of factors external to the game. With a small
probability ε, equation 13 is ignored and pti is instead drawn at random from
[qmin, qmax]
2 with uniform distribution. This is known as a mutation.
Of course, equation 12 is undefined during the first few rounds of play. For
t = 1, . . . ,max(m1,m2), p
t




As shown in section 2.2, the bargaining game has many Nash equilibria. It is
easily verified that all of the non-degenerate Nash equilibria of the game are also
evolutionary stable strategies. Hence, the question is how to define or identify
the most likely outcome of the game.
We are interested in finding the stochastically stable strategies of the game.
Stochastically stable strategies are a refinement of the concept of evolution-
ary stable strategies. Any stochastically stable strategy is also an evolutionary
stable strategy, but the reverse is not true.
In an evolutionary system such as our multi-agent model, an evolutionary stable
strategy is stable in the short run, as neither agent has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally. However, over increasingly long time scales there is an increasing
probability that mutations disturb the equilibrium and cause the system to enter
a different equilibrium. On sufficiently long timescales, the system behaves er-
godic, switching back and forth between different evolutionary stable strategies.
The timescale at which this kind of behaviour is typical is called the long run,
or sometimes the ultra-long run [10].
Stochastically stable strategies are the evolutionary stable strategies that occur
the most frequently in the long run, when the mutation rate ε approaches zero.
For a full definition we refer the reader to [4].
3 Simulations
We will use simulations to gain insight into the stochastically stable strategies
under different parameter settings of the model. The model will be run for a
large but finite number of rounds TMAX , under different parameter settings.
We will then analyze the results, using autocorrelation in the series under dif-
ferent time lags to find empirically what timescale constitutes the long run, i.e.,
at what timescale the system behaves ergodic.
3.1 Experimental Setup
The primary question that we wish to address is the role of information: what
happens when one agent has an information advantage over the other? What if
one agent has a longer memory? We have set up a series of five experiments (E3
and E6 . . . E9) to compare the behaviour of the system under varying differences
in memory.
The second question we wish to address is: how sensitive are the outcomes to a
change in λ? For this purpose, we have set up a second series of experiments,
E1 . . . E5, where λ was varied. Experiment E3 serves as the benchmark, as it has
equal memory for both players and a value of λ of 0.5, splitting the remainder
in equation 9 equally.
Table 1 provides an overview of all the parameter settings that have been used
in the experiments. The ratio of b and c has been chosen such that it maximizes
the potential gain from cooperation [1]. The mutation rate ε has been chosen as
small as feasible to approximate the stochastically stable equilibria.
Table 1. Overview of Parameter Values
parameter experiment







λ 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
m1 8
m2 8 8 8 8 8 6 4 2 1
3.2 Results
In this section we will analyze the output, series of resulting utility values uti.
They are not time independent, but strongly autocorrelated. That is also to be
expected, since a stochastic equilibrium is defined as the equilibrium that the is
dominant in the long run. In order to find out what the long run is in this game,
we need to find out at what time lag the autocorrelation between subsequent
proposals approaches zero.







In figure 1 all the autocorrelation plots of the experiments are shown. As
expected, autocorrelation vanishes at sufficiently long timescale. From the figure
we estimate a time lag of τ = 50.000 as the typical long run.
Now we can sample measurements from each of the series at intervals of
50.000 rounds and treat them as approximately independent. Figure 2 shows a
histogram of the resulting sample for benchmark experiment E3.
As can be seen from figure 2, the measurements follow a roughly bell shaped
curve, with a group of outliers at the disagreement utility UD. The outliers result
from rounds where the negotiations failed. Since the interval [qmin, qmax] does
not contain degenerate equilibria, failed negotiations are not part of a stochas-
tichally stable equilibrium. Therefore, we will ignore those measurements in the
remainder of the analysis.
We assume by the bell shaped form of the rest of the distribution that there
is a single stochastically stable equilibrium and estimate it by taking the mean
value. The mean values for each experiment, after dismissing outliers, can be
found in table 2.
In the benchmark experiment E3, with equal memory and λ = 0.5, agents
have on average been following the Nash Bargaining Solution (u∗ = 0.3141)































Fig. 1. Autocorrelation as a function of timelag, for both agents in each of the exper-
iments.


















Fig. 2. Histogram of utility values sampled from E3.
a normal distribution with mean u∗.
When λ differs from 0.5, as in expirements E1, E2, E4 and E5, it clearly nega-
tively affects the results of negotiations. For each of those experiments, average
utility remained significantly below u∗, all at p-values below 10−5.
Table 2. Average observed utility values (outliers removed)
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9
λ 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
m2 8 8 8 8 8 6 4 2 1
u1 0.3098 0.3129 0.3140 0.3131 0.3101 0.3125 0.3125 0.3131 0.3129
u2 0.3099 0.3128 0.3142 0.3133 0.3102 0.3149 0.3148 0.3141 0.3141
Agents with shorter memory length have a clear advantage in the long run.
Experiments E6 to E9 all seem to favour the less informed agent 2. However,
the results from those experiments show a wide spread, with long tails. This
might explain why a t-test shows no statistical significant difference between
both agents in E8 and E9. In E6 and E7, however, the difference is significant
at the 1% confidence level.
The average utilities observed in the experiments with asymmetric information
are all below the Pareto frontier. For example, in E6 agent 1 had an average
utility of 0.3125. It follows from 7 that a pareto optimal solution with this u1
should have u2 = 0.3157. The actual average u2 was lower, even though a t-test
shows no statistal significance. The same holds for E7 to E9.
4 Conclusions and Outlook
Even though our model is strongly simplified, especially as it is a two agent
model, it nonetheless offers important insights into myopic bargaining on pollu-
tion games.
As often in adaptive play, agents are able to coordinate on a Pareto efficient
outcome, without knowing each others payoff functions. However, this is not
guaranteed and depends on parameter values of the model, moreso than in many
other applications of adaptive play.
Surprisingly, it turns out that having a shorter memory is an advantage in the
long run. This must be due to the structure of the pollution game, as adaptive
play has been applied in this fashion to a similar bargaining game [10], where
adaptive play favours the agents remembering more of the past under any pa-
rameter settings.
This result indicates that adaptive play may be too limiting for studying pollu-
tion games. While we believe that evolutionary economics is generally a promis-
ing venue for studying bounded rationality, the challenge for future research is
to understand the behaviour of agents that are imperfect, yet less short sighted
than in adaptive play.
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